

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
DALLAS DIVISION

BRENTDRICK DEMOND COLLIER, §  
#02220895, §  
§  
Petitioner, §  
§  
V. § No. 3:23-cv-2282-G-BN  
§  
§  
WARDEN BRISTOW, §  
§  
§  
Respondent. §

**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Brentdrick Demond Collier, a Texas prisoner proceeding *pro se*, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 collaterally attacking his 2018 Dallas County conviction for indecency with a child, which resulted in a sentence of 20 years of incarceration. *See State v. Collier*, F-1776269-P (203d Jud. Dist. Ct., Dall. Cty., Tex. Sept. 4, 2018); Dkt. No. 3 at 1.

Senior United States District Judge A. Joe Fish referred this case to a United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference. On December 7, 2023, the case was reassigned to the undersigned United States magistrate judge by special order. *See* Dkt. No. 7.

The undersigned now enters these findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendation that, under the circumstances here and for the reasons and to the extent set out below, the Court should dismiss the federal habeas challenge under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (Habeas Rule 4).

### **Legal Standards**

Habeas Rule 4 allows a district court to summarily dismiss a habeas application “[i]f it plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” *Id.*; *see also Kiser v. Johnson*, 163 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 1999) (“This rule differentiates habeas cases from other civil cases with respect to *sua sponte* consideration of affirmative defenses. The district court has the power under [Habeas] Rule 4 to examine and dismiss frivolous habeas petitions prior to any answer or other pleading by the state. This power is rooted in ‘the duty of the court to screen out frivolous applications and eliminate the burden that would be placed on the respondent by ordering an unnecessary answer.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254 Rule 4 Advisory Committee Notes)).

While “the statute of limitations provision of the AEDPA [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996] is an affirmative defense rather than jurisdictional,” a district court may dismiss a time barred Section 2254 application *sua sponte* under Habeas Rule 4. *Kiser*, 163 F.3d at 329. But, “before acting on its own initiative’ to dismiss an apparently untimely § 2254 petition as time barred, a district court ‘must accord the parties fair notice and an opportunity to present their positions.’” *Wyatt v. Thaler*, 395 F. App’x 113, 114 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (cleaned up; quoting *Day v. McDonough*, 547 U.S. 198, 210 (2006)).

Under the circumstances here, these findings, conclusions, and recommendation provide Collier fair notice, and the opportunity to file objections to

them (further explained below) affords a chance to present to the Court his position as to the limitations concerns explained below. *See, e.g., Ingram v. Dir., TDCJ-CID*, No. 6:12cv489, 2012 WL 3986857, at \*1 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2012) (a magistrate judge’s report and recommendation gives the parties “fair notice that the case may be dismissed as time-barred, which [gives a petitioner] the opportunity to file objections to show that the case should not be dismissed based on the statute of limitations.” (collecting cases)).

AEDPA “introduced both ‘simple logic’ to the federal habeas landscape and uniform rules for federal courts to apply.” *Wallace v. Mississippi*, 43 F.4th 482, 492 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting *Smith v. Titus*, 141 S. Ct. 982, 987 (2021) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting from denial of cert.), then citing *Day*, 547 U.S. at 202 n.1).

“Namely, it implemented a host of greatly needed procedural requirements for petitioners seeking habeas relief.” *Id.* (citing *Brown v. Davenport*, 142 S. Ct. 1510, 1524 (2022) (“In many ways, the statute represented a sea change in federal habeas law.”)). One such requirement is “the one-year period for an individual in custody pursuant to a state-court judgment to file a § 2254 petition for habeas relief” that “begins running from the latest of four events.” *Id.* at 497 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)):

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized

by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1).

The time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is pending is excluded from the limitations period. *See id.* § 2244(d)(2).

The one-year limitations period is also subject to equitable tolling – “a discretionary doctrine that turns on the facts and circumstances of a particular case,” *Fisher v. Johnson*, 174 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1999), and only applies in “rare and exceptional circumstances,” *United States v. Riggs*, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing *Davis v. Johnson*, 158 F.3d 806, 811 (5th Cir. 1998)). “[A] litigant is entitled to equitable tolling of a statute of limitations only if the litigant establishes two elements: ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing.’”

*Menominee Indian Tribe of Wis. v. United States*, 577 U.S. 250, 255 (2016) (quoting *Holland v. Florida*, 560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010)).

Taking the second prong first, “[a] petitioner’s failure to satisfy the statute of limitations must result from external factors beyond his control; delays of the petitioner’s own making do not qualify.” *Hardy v. Quarterman*, 577 F.3d 596, 598 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (citation omitted). This “prong of the equitable tolling test is met only where the circumstances that caused a litigant’s delay are both

extraordinary and beyond [the litigant's] control." *Menominee Indian Tribe*, 577 U.S. at 257.

But "[t]he diligence required for equitable tolling purposes is reasonable diligence, not maximum feasible diligence.' What a petitioner did both before and after the extraordinary circumstances that prevented him from timely filing may indicate whether he was diligent overall." *Jackson v. Davis*, 933 F.3d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting *Holland*, 560 U.S. at 653; footnote omitted).

A showing of "actual innocence" can also overcome AEDPA's statute of limitations. *See McQuiggin v. Perkins*, 569 U.S. 383, 386 (2013). But the actual innocence gateway is only available to a petitioner who presents "evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error." *Id.* at 401 (quoting *Schlup v. Delo*, 513 U.S. 298, 316 (1995)). That is, the petitioner's new, reliable evidence must be enough to persuade the Court that "no juror, acting reasonably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." *Id.* at 386 (quoting *Schlup*, 513 U.S. at 329); *see also Johnson v. Hargett*, 978 F.2d 855, 859-60 (5th Cir. 1992) ("The Supreme Court has made clear that the term 'actual innocence' means *factual*, as opposed to *legal*, innocence – 'legal' innocence, of course, would arise whenever a constitutional violation by itself requires reversal, whereas 'actual' innocence, as the Court stated in *McCleskey [v. Zant*, 499 U.S. 467 (1991)], means that the person did not commit the crime." (footnotes omitted)); *Acker v. Davis*, 693 F. App'x 384, 392-93 (5th Cir 2017) (per curiam) ("Successful gateway

claims of actual innocence are ‘extremely rare,’ and relief is available only in the ‘extraordinary case’ where there was ‘manifest injustice.’” (quoting *Schlup*, 513 U.S. at 324, 327)).

### **Analysis**

The timeliness of most Section 2254 applications – Collier’s is no exception – is determined under Subsection A, based on the date on which the judgment became final. A state criminal judgment becomes final under AEDPA “when there is no more ‘availability of direct appeal to the state courts.’” *Frosch v. Thaler*, No. 2:12-CV-231, 2013 WL 271423, at \*1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 3, 2013) (quoting *Jimenez v. Quarterman*, 555 U.S. 113, 119 (2009)), *rec. adopted*, 2013 WL 271446 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 24, 2013).

Here, the Dallas Court of Appeals reformed the state trial court’s judgment to reflect that Collier was not sentenced under a plea agreement. *See Collier v. State*, No. 05-19-00435-CR, 2020 WL 219322, at \*1 (Tex. App.–Dallas Jan. 15, 2020, pet. ref’d). As modified, the judgment was affirmed. *See id.* The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (the CCA) refused his petition for discretionary review (PDR). *See Collier v. State*, PD-0107-20 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 11, 2020). There is no record that Collier then petitioned the United States Supreme Court for certiorari review. The state criminal judgment he now challenges therefore became final for federal-limitations purposes no later than June 9, 2020, when the 90-day period to file a certiorari petition expired following the CCA’s refusal of Collier’s PDR. *See Roberts v. Cockrell*, 319 F.3d 690, 694 (5th Cir. 2003) (“finality [is] established by the expiration of the ninety-day period to seek further review with the Supreme Court”).

And, although Collier sought state habeas relief through a petition filed no earlier than August 6, 2021, *see Ex parte Collier*, No. W17-76269-P(A) (203d Jud. Dist. Ct., Dall. Cty. Tex.), which the CCA denied without written order on the findings of the trial court without a hearing and on the CCA’s independent review of the record, *see Ex parte Collier*, No. WR-93,557-01 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 13, 2022), “[b]ecause [Collier’s] state habeas petition was not filed within the one-year period” that commenced on June 9, 2020, the petition “did not statutorily toll the limitation clock,” *Palacios v. Stephens*, 723 F.3d 600, 604 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing *Scott v. Johnson*, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000) (in turn citing 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2))).

So Collier’s Section 2254 petition is more than two years too late, as it was filed no sooner than October 5, 2023, the date on which he certifies that it was placed in the prison mailing system. *See* Dkt. No. 3 at 15; *see also* RULE 3(d), RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS (“A paper filed by an inmate confined in an institution is timely if deposited in the institution’s internal mailing system on or before the last day for filing.”); *Uranga v. Davis*, 893 F.3d 282, 286 (5th Cir. 2018) (“We reaffirm that the operative date of the prison mailbox rule remains the date the pleading is delivered to prison authorities.”).

It should therefore be denied as untimely under Section 2244(d)(1)(A) absent statutory or equitable tolling of the limitations period.

But Collier neither relies on another provision of Section 2244(d)(1), nor advances a claim of tolling under the narrow actual innocence gateway. He appears to assert grounds for equitable tolling based on his direct appeal not being presented

to the state appellate court until 2019, and because “with [him] not having paid representation, [he] had to make sure [he] was in the right direction with the order process of filing Appeal and petitions.” Dkt. No. 3 at 13. His allegations do not establish either prong of equitable tolling – that he pursued his rights diligently and that an extraordinary circumstance beyond his control prevented the timely filing of the federal habeas petition. *See Felder v. Johnson*, 204 F.3d 168, 171-72 (5th Cir. 2000).

The Court should therefore dismiss the Section 2254 petition with prejudice as time barred.

### **Recommendations and Directions to Clerk**


Under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, the Court should dismiss Petitioner Brentdrick Demond Collier’s 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas application as time barred. And the Court should direct that the Clerk of Court serve any order accepting or adopting this recommendation on the Texas Attorney General.

The Clerk shall serve electronically a copy of this recommendation and the petition on the Texas Attorney General as counsel for Respondent, directed to the attention of Edward L. Marshall, Chief, Criminal Appeals Division, Texas Attorney General’s Office. *See RULE 4, RULES GOVERNING SECTION 2254 CASES IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS.*

A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections

within 14 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).

DATED: March 5, 2024



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DAVID L. HORAN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE